

NORWAY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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S u m m a r y

In accordance with the Norwegian "nuclear policy", laid down in a parliamentary white paper in 1960-61, nuclear weapons (i.e. nuclear warheads) are not to be stationed on Norwegian territory in peacetime.

Norway is involved in the nuclear arms race between the superpowers in mainly three ways:

(a) the Norwegian government has generally supported the nuclear dispositions of NATO;

(b) Norway provides her allies with military installations or facilities which contribute to the strategic use of nuclear weapons;

(c) there exist plans (and exercises) for the deployment and use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory in wartime.

The first wave of anti-nuclear weapon protest reached Norway in 1960 and ebbed away, due to developments in Norwegian politics, rather soon after the formulation of the Norwegian "nuclear policy" in 1961.

The first manifestation of the second wave was the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb in 1977-78, initiated by the Norwegian Peace Council (affiliated with IPB, Geneva). Perhaps as a result of the campaign, which comprised 22 major Norwegian organisations, the Norwegian government declared after more than six months' hesitation that it was "negative to the production of neutron weapons". This position was reaffirmed in February 1981. The issue of the neutron bomb in 1977-78 revealed a considerable potential in the Norwegian population for more comprehensive campaigns for nuclear disarmament.

During October and November 1979 a massive opposition developed in Norway against the NATO plans for new nuclear weapons in Europe and against the Soviet SS-20s. A catalyst of this opposition was the spontaneously launched campaign No to New Nuclear Weapons. A very intense debate erupted and flooded the media for six weeks. Although the Norwegian government supported the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, a majority of the population were against the plans. So were a majority of the members, and a majority of the county boards, of the governing Labour Party, as well as a number of trade union federations, political youth organisations, women's organisations, and peace organisations.

In the spring of 1980 women in the Nordic countries initiated the campaign Women for Peace and canvassed signatures for a petition demanding "Disarmament for lasting world peace! The millions spent on weapons to be used for providing food! NO to war!" 500,000 signatures (about 70,000 collected in Norway) were presented to the UNO Conference of Women in Copenhagen in July 1980.

The autumn of 1980 was dominated by the issue of pre-positioning of heavy US military materiel in Norway. A massive campaign was mounted against the plans, which were seen by the opponents as part of the US forward-based strategy, potentially linked to nuclear doctrines, and which were feared to lead to increased tension in the North. The campaign collected more than 100,000 signatures for its petition, and ^{according to opinion polls} about one half of those who had taken a position on the question, opposed the plans, which were accepted by Parliament in January 1981. In autumn 1980 an Information Committee for Defence Debate was also established in Norway.

The past six months have been dominated by the debate about a nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries, a debate which in its intensity could not have been foreseen a year ago. The proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone has been adopted by the governing Labour Party, and in one guise or another by most of the other political parties in Norway. At the end of April 1981 No to Nuclear Weapons launched a massive signature collecting campaign for a petition requesting the Norwegian parliament to resolve that the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory never be allowed, and requesting the Norwegian government to make every possible effort to establish a nuclear-free zone comprising Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, and guaranteed by treaty. Opinion polls seem to indicate that both demands have the support of the majority of the population. A Nordic nuclear-free zone is regarded by the campaign as a confidence building measure and a step on the way to a Europe free of nuclear weapons. No to Nuclear Weapons, which has now more than 300 local groups and contacts and which seems to be developing into a real popular movement, is also continuing its resistance against new nuclear eurostrategic weapons in East and West.

The proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone has become one of the main issues in Norwegian politics. The proposal is also supported by the Peace March 1981 from Copenhagen to Paris, which was originally launched by three Norwegian women. The main slogan of the march, which has received extraordinary publicity in Norwegian media, is "A nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal".

Typical of the present situation in Norway is the multitude of different initiatives that are taken. Recently a Children's Campaign for Peace has been launched, a group of medical doctors against nuclear and chemical weapons has been active for some time, scientists and engineers have launched an appeal for zones free of chemical weapons, the Labour Party women's organisation is establishing an Alva Myrdal disarmament fund, local peace marches and peace rallies are organised, a ministry ~~or~~ directorate for peace and disarmament has been proposed, etc.

Trade union federations have to a considerable extent supported the movement for nuclear disarmament from the autumn of 1979, and this past spring a debate about nuclear disarmament has developed in religious groups and church bodies.

Provided that no dramatic changes occur in the international situation, the popular movement for nuclear disarmament which is now developing may make a lasting impression on Norwegian politics.

1. The Norwegian "Nuclear Policy"

In accordance with the Norwegian "nuclear policy", laid down in a parliamentary white paper in 1960-61, nuclear weapons (i.e. nuclear warheads) are not to be stationed on Norwegian territory in peacetime.

This policy was formulated as the result of a fairly intense debate during the years 1957-61 over the possibility of placing tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Norway.

At the NATO heads of government meeting of December 1957 the Norwegian Prime Minister declared that Norway would not permit nuclear arsenals or IRBMs on its territory. IRBMs on Norwegian soil would function as strategic weapons, covering significant parts of Soviet territory. In a debate in Parliament in January 1958, the Prime Minister stated that IRBMs in Norway would strain relations with the Soviet Union unjustifiably.

In 1959-61 there was a national debate of some magnitude concerning tactical nuclear weapons. The crucial part of the debate took place within the governing Labour Party, and the debate was settled there. The 1957 General Conference of the Labour Party had approved unanimously a surprise motion from the floor that "nuclear weapons must not be placed on Norwegian territory". The 1961 Conference near-unanimously modified the policy to read as follows: "Norway decides at any time through its constitutional bodies what actions are necessary in order to preserve the security and independence of the country. The Labour Party ~~reaffirms~~ its position that nuclear weapons are not to be stationed on Norwegian territory. This position necessitates increased emphasis on an effective preparedness based on conventional forces". This declaration is somewhat ambiguous on the question of war or the threat of war as a sufficient reason for voiding the so-called "nuclear policy". However, a parliamentary white paper presented in late 1960 and the following parliamentary debate make it clear that the "nuclear policy" applies to peacetime only.

2. The Role of Norway in the Nuclear Arms Race

Norway is involved in the nuclear arms race between the super-powers in mainly three ways:

a) the Norwegian government has generally supported the nuclear dispositions of NATO;

b) Norway provides her allies with military installations or facilities which contribute to the strategic use of nuclear weapons;

c) there exist plans (and exercises) for the deployment and use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory in ~~peacetime~~ wartime.

The Norwegian government participates in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and supports NATO's nuclear strategy, including the possible first use of tactical or strategic weapons. There is no evidence that the Norwegian government has ever opposed a NATO proposal regarding nuclear weapons or nuclear strategy. On the contrary, the Norwegian government has supported all public decisions, with the exception of the introduction of the US countervailing strategy, which was discussed in NATO fora in the spring^{and autumn} of 1980. Norway did not oppose the new strategy but abstained from taking a position on this question, probably as the result of the strong public opinion which had developed in Norway at this time.

Up to now the Norwegian government has on the whole proved a very "obedient" ally in the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. It should be noted, for instance, that the Norwegian decision in 1957 not to permit nuclear weapons arsenals or IRBMs on Norwegian territory, and the 1961 decision of non-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in peacetime, did not run counter to stated US or NATO interests. Thus in 1957 SACEUR announced that the NATO defence did not require IRBMs to be deployed in all member countries, and that there were no particular reasons for deploying them in Denmark or Norway. Nor has any evidence been revealed of US pressure on Norway to store tactical weapons before the 1961 decision of peacetime non-deployment of such weapons. Thus the Norwegian policy of non-deployment of nuclear weapons in peacetime should probably be understood primarily as a domestic political compromise, reflecting different political views within the governing Labour Party and in the Norwegian population in general, and ^{as} a convenient military posture, rather than an arms control measure.

Although the Norwegian government does not permit nuclear warheads to be stationed on Norwegian territory in peacetime, Norway contributes to the nuclear strategy of the US and NATO

Norwegian soil or in Norwegian territorial waters. Some of these have been built under the NATO infrastructure programme, while others have been introduced under bilateral agreements between Norway and the US. Thus over the past twenty years a series of navigation and communication stations ~~have been~~ for military purposes have been established on Norwegian soil. Some of these are part of the US Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programme, e.g. two Loran-C stations, which are low-frequency radio navigation aids for the Polaris and Poseidon submarines.

Norway is also heavily involved in programmes for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-submarine warfare being a decisive element in the development of first strike capability. This involvement includes inter alia surveillance from Orion aircraft and a SOSUS chain (sound surveillance system, consisting of a network of hydrophones at the bottom of the sea) from the coast of Finnmark in Northern Norway. Although these systems are important for the USA's regaining the first strike capability which was lost twenty years ago (when the USSR deployed ICBMs), they may also serve as early warning systems in peacetime. However, in spite of the official Norwegian view, they seem to be of little importance to the capacity of retaliation or deterrence, since they are so easily destroyed. In wartime their very vulnerability makes them best suited for offensive purposes. It has been argued that Norway could help check the development towards first strike capability by limiting her involvement in ASW.

A major Norwegian contribution to the US forward-based strategy - and in view of the current strategic concepts - a contribution to US and NATO nuclear strategy - is a number of airfields earmarked for the transfer of US and allied aircraft in contingency situations. Allegedly 200-300 allied aircraft would be transferred to Norwegian airfields in crisis or war, most of these probably under the COB programme (co-located operating bases). The COB programme was initiated after the loss of the US airfields in France, and at present the programme comprises about 50 airfields, five of which are situated in Norway, a number which may increase in the future. In the current debate Norway has thus been characterised as a "mainland aircraft carrier". It is not yet known what kinds of aircraft would be transferred under the COB programme, but it has been confirmed by Norwegian authorities that F-111 aircraft and Vulcan bombers (the latter now being phased out and replaced by Tornados) have exercised

in Norway. These are aircraft that can be used for medium-range nuclear operations against Soviet territory and which may be better suited for US strategic purposes than for the defence of Norwegian territory.

Since the Norwegian policy of non-stationing of nuclear warheads is confined to peacetime, there naturally exist plans for wartime deployment and use. Whereas there were military exercises in the late 1950s and early '60s where Norwegian forces simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons against an enemy, the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory today seems to rely mainly on allied forces fully trained and equipped for this purpose. According to the white paper of 1960-61 on Norway's nuclear policy, Norwegian forces may participate to the extent it is practical. But the current official view is that Norwegian troops are not trained in the use of nuclear weapons. It is known, however, that staff exercises may include requisition and use of such weapons.

Although the Norwegian nuclear policy does not allow the stationing of nuclear warheads on Norwegian territory in peacetime, delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons may be deployed. (Thus Honest John missiles with a range of up to 24 km were stationed in Norway from 1959 onwards, at a time when this missile was ^{probably} only suited for nuclear warheads.) Nuclear weapons can be transferred to the Norwegian war theatre by fighter bombers on carriers or from land bases. Nuclear weapons can also be fired from platforms at sea (a variety of types are deployed and new ones will be added), and nuclear warheads can be fired by the NATO "fire corps" or from dual capable artillery already in the Norwegian inventory, such as 155 mm howitzers. The prohibition of deployment of nuclear warheads on Norwegian soil in peacetime is therefore to a large extent an empty provision from a military point of view. It places no significant restraint on US use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory.

Although the Norwegian nuclear policy seems to be an empty provision from a military point of view (acceptance by Norwegian authorities is a requirement for using nuclear

weapons on or from Norwegian territory), it has probably served the important function of helping pacify the Norwegian public opinion with regard to nuclear weapons and Norway's contribution to the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. Over the past twenty years a large percentage of the Norwegian population have probably been under the impression that the Norwegian government has vetoed the deployment of nuclear warheads on Norwegian territory not only in peacetime but also in wartime. It is only in recent years that information has been revealed concerning strategic installations and services that link Norway more or less to the front of the nuclear arms race.¹⁾

3. Movements for Nuclear Disarmament 1960 - 1981

3.1. The First Wave of Anti-Nuclear Protest - the Early 1960s

The first European wave of anti-nuclear protest, which developed at the end of the 1950s, reached Norway in 1960, about the time when the Easter marches climaxed in Britain. The first Scandinavian march was organised in Denmark in October 1960. In November the same year the Norwegian campaign "Protest Against Nuclear Weapons - The Committee of 13" was launched. The 13 initiators of the campaign counted well known representatives of e.g. trade unions, women's organisations, the universities and the Church. The campaign concentrated on the collection of signatures and the organising of protest marches and rallies. 223,000 signatures were collected during the spring of 1961 (when the Norwegian nuclear policy was to be discussed in Parliament) and on 19 March 1961 demonstrations were staged in several Norwegian towns and cities. The demonstration in Oslo gathered about 10,000 participants, up to then the largest march in the post-war period. Co-operating with the Committee of 13 there was another campaign, the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament". After the 1961 General Conference of the Labour Party, which adopted a motion that "nuclear weapons are not to be stationed on Norwegian territory", the leadership of the Committee of 13 announced their satisfaction with the declaration, and the campaign was dissolved during the Pauling conference against proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was held in Oslo in May 1961. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and some local sections of the Committee of 13 continued their work, and in 1962 merged

into the "Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons". This campaign organised Easter marches in 1963 and 1964, but with somewhat slender participation. After a few years the campaign withered away and was finally dissolved. The ebbing away of the first wave of anti-nuclear protest in Norway seems primarily to be due to developments in Norwegian politics: the adoption of the Norwegian nuclear policy in 1961 (which seems to have ~~reassured~~ reassured many opponents of nuclear weapons), the launching of the Socialist People's Party the same year (a party which grew out of the anti-nuclear protest and the ~~eminent~~ discontent with the Labour Party, and which absorbed many activists in the anti-nuclear-weapon movement at the time), and the increasing debate over the issue of the Common Market from 1961 onwards. These events seem to have played a more important part than developments on the international scene, such as ^{the conclusion} ~~the agreement~~ of the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which may have helped pacify public opinion in other countries. ²⁾

3.2. The Beginning of the Second Wave: The Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb 1977-78

After 1961 no defence or even foreign policy issue mobilised Norwegian public opinion to any great extent, a partial exception being the debate over Common Market membership in 1971-72. That debate, however, was to a great extent a debate over domestic issues, since it was largely concerned with the impact of the Common Market on Norwegian society.

From 1975 onwards there was at times a fairly intense but rather limited debate about Norway's involvement since the end of the 1950s in the Loran-C system. And in 1977 information was disclosed about a number of electronic intelligence or monitoring stations established for US purposes on Norwegian soil. Although these debates contributed to greater awareness of Norway's participation in the arms race between the superpowers, the debates were by and large confined to the traditional debating parties in Norwegian security policy.

It is the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb, organised in January 1978 (i.e. at a time when the campaigns in e.g. the Netherlands and Denmark were well advanced), which marks the beginning of the second wave of anti-nuclear weapon protest in Norway. The initiative was taken by the executive of the

Norwegian Peace Council (affiliated with the International Peace Bureau, Geneva) and the first manifestation was a full page advertisement in a Christian daily newspaper on 27 December 1977, where the Norwegian section of International Fellowship of Reconciliation and the youth organisation of the Christian People's Party invited readers to sign an appeal to the Norwegian government urging the government to oppose the plans for the neutron bomb. On 25 January 1978 the campaign was formally launched, with the support of 20 Norwegian organisations. Later the number of member organisations increased to 22, comprising all major political youth organisations, except the Conservatives and the Marxist-Leninists, and a number of peace organisations. The platform adopted read as follows:

We are protesting against the neutron bomb because:

1. The neutron bomb will stimulate even further the nuclear arms race between the great powers. The arms race is in itself a threat to peace. We must work for disarmament.
2. The neutron bomb is a particularly inhumane weapon. Radiation will cause dreadful pain to civilians and soldiers who do not die immediately. In the long run radioactive radiation leads to genetic disturbances.
3. The neutron bomb will lower the nuclear threshold, i.e. make more likely the use of nuclear weapons in war.
4. Deployment of the neutron bomb in Western Europe will reinforce the tendency to rely on nuclear weapons in this region instead of relying on conventional weapons.
5. The neutron bomb may stimulate research for a number of new types of nuclear weapons. If the US produces the neutron bomb, this will as a reaction lead to the introduction of new Soviet weapons.
6. The introduction of the neutron bomb will increase the likelihood that countries which today are relying on conventional weapons will procure nuclear arms. The neutron bomb will therefore contribute to the further weakening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Norway in other contexts has wanted to strengthen.
7. If neutron weapons are introduced in NATO, this will poison the climate of international negotiations and create great difficulties for the existing negotiations about a comprehensive test ban treaty and on the reduction of forces in Europe. It may have a very adverse effect on the UN Special Session on Disarmament in May-June.

We protest against the neutron bomb and urge the Norwegian government to take an unambiguous position against the planned production and deployment of neutron weapons in Europe.

Although the campaign canvassed signatures for this appeal,

perhaps most of its efforts were directed towards influencing the political parties in Parliament, on the one hand through lobbying and through their youth organisations (which were members of the campaign), on the other hand by making visible and increasing the opposition to the plans in Norwegian public opinion through news media. The campaign also considered it an important task to inform movements abroad about developments in Norway.

The activities of the campaign were favoured to some extent by the fact that the Norwegian government had fairly recently presented a white paper on disarmament and arms control, which was to be debated in Parliament some time during the spring, and was also strongly involved in the preparations of the UN Special Session on Disarmament to be held in May-June 1978. This helped bring disarmament questions to the fore, and the recognition that the arms race is counterproductive to security, a view endorsed by the Norwegian government, was beginning to take root in political parties and public opinion. Outright support for the production and deployment of neutron weapons would therefore be difficult to reconcile with the disarmament profile or image which the government seemed to be cutting for itself.

On the other hand the Norwegian government has traditionally played a passive and reticent role in NATO, and there seems also to be a fear that exposure of differences within NATO may be exploited by opponents of the alliance. These factors probably go a long way towards explaining the ambiguous attitude of the Norwegian government from the autumn of 1977 until 19 April 1978. Thus it took more than half a year to extract an unequivocal statement opposing the neutron bomb.

Apart from the frequent press reports on the debate in other countries (e.g. in the FRG, the Netherlands and the US), and the activities of the campaign itself, perhaps four particular events influenced to some extent the development of the neutron weapons issue in Norway:

At an early stage of the debate, on 10 October 1977, the Norwegian government's advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament adopted a statement which emphasised the negative effects of production and deployment of neutron weapons. This statement provided significant support to those arguing against the neutron bomb, and could not easily be ignored by the

government.

On 4 March 1978 the Dutch Minister of Defence, Mr Kruisinga, resigned from his post as a Cabinet member because of his opposition to the plans for neutron weapons. On the day of his resignation he sent a letter to the leader of the Norwegian Christian People's Party, a personal friend of his, where he stated his views on the enhanced radiation warhead. It is not unlikely that the letter, which also received publicity in Norwegian news media, carried some weight in this rather important opposition party in Parliament. Perhaps equally important was a statement from the Spring Meeting of the Bishops which warned against a continued arms race.

A third important event during the spring was Daniel Ellsberg's visit to Norway on 3 and 4 April, as a guest of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb. Ellsberg gave a seminar on nuclear strategy and enhanced radiation warheads, and had talks with party leaders. The visit received extensive news coverage and Ellsberg's background gave his analyses considerable weight.

The fourth event was the news report that President Carter had deferred a decision on the production of the neutron bomb. This news was received at noon on 4 April when Parliament was debating the government's white paper on arms control and disarmament, a debate which was dominated by the issue of the neutron bomb. The news of the American President's decision probably made it easier for some MPs to pronounce their uneasiness about the proposed radiation warhead.

In the parliamentary debate on 4 April a majority of the MPs who took the floor pronounced themselves against the production and deployment of the neutron bomb, and the chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (and chairperson of the governing Labour Party as well), Mr Reiulf Steen, stated that "a decision not under any circumstance to produce the neutron weapon will give the Carter administration an offensive position in the efforts of disarmament", thus explicitly rejecting the neutron bomb as a bargaining chip.

However, it was only two weeks later, in the weekly Question Time on 19 April, that the Foreign Minister gave an unambiguous statement rejecting the plans for the neutron bomb: "...it should be clear what is the government's view, that it is negative to the production of neutron weapons". In the same speech the

foreign Minister expressed expectations that the US decision would meet with an accommodating attitude from the USSR and have a positive effect on negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

In a letter to the government the campaign expressed its satisfaction with the Foreign Minister's statement. In the letter the campaign also stated:

The Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb wishes to call attention to the fact that at the same time as President Carter has postponed a decision on production of the neutron bomb, it has also been decided to modernise the delivery systems for adaptation to neutron warheads. The situation is therefore very serious and the Norwegian government must actively oppose this kind of preparations for neutron weapons. (...)

The Campaign ~~will~~ requests the government to take initiatives to bring the US and the USSR and other nuclear powers to abstain from development and production of new nuclear weapons and take steps towards disarmament.

On 9 April the campaign had addressed telegrams to the presidents Carter and Brezhnev urging both parties to declare abstention from further development and production of nuclear weapon systems and to take unilateral and bilateral steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Thus the campaign was fully aware that the neutron bomb had not been definitively abandoned by the US, a fact which seemed to elude news media to a large extent, and was also aware of reports that France was planning to develop enhanced radiation warheads.

The Norwegian position on the neutron bomb was reaffirmed by the Foreign Minister on 11 February 1981, in connection with the new debate which was emerging in the US.

In retrospect it seems that the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb had mainly three functions: (a) It channelled, and strengthened public opinion against the plans for neutron weapons, thus perhaps contributing to the Norwegian government's position against these weapons; (b) it revealed a considerable potential in Norwegian public opinion for more comprehensive campaigns for nuclear disarmament; (c) it provided valuable experience for future campaigns, experience that was to prove useful in the campaign against Cruise, Pershing II and SS-20 missiles in the autumn of 1979.

3.3. Pershing II, Cruise Missiles and SS-20: "No to New Nuclear Weapons" - Autumn 1979

During October and November 1979 a massive opposition developed in Norway against the NATO plans for new nuclear weapons in

Europe. A very intense debate erupted and more or less flooded the media for six weeks. In intensity the debate was probably unparalleled in the field of foreign policy since the great Common Market issue in 1971-72.

Although the NATO plans had been mentioned in two or three major newspapers in the summer of 1979, concrete information about the plans became known to a larger Norwegian public only in the middle of October. And it was only then that the import and probable consequences of the proposed deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles were recognised by larger groups, the plans being also to some extent perceived as a link in a more comprehensive programme for nuclear build-up.

In a somewhat simplified perspective, two events in particular sparked off the public debate: the visit of US arms control experts Arthur M. Cox and Herbert Scoville (former CIA deputy director for science and technology), and the spontaneous launching of the campaign No to New Nuclear Weapons.

The two US arms control experts visited Oslo on about 10 October as guests of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Norwegian Pugwash Committee. Cox and Scoville warned that deployment of new nuclear weapons might open up a new and uncontrollable arms race in Europe. If, on the other hand, no decision for production and deployment was made by the NATO Council, the possibility would exist of using the threat of future deployment as a bargaining card in negotiations with the USSR. The latter might agree to negotiate a withdrawal of its forces and reduction of its medium-range missiles, provided no pre-empting decision on deployment of the new weapons were made by the NATO Council.

On 20 October preparations for a campaign against new missiles started, and the campaign was publicly launched on 25 October, the day of the comprehensive autumn term debate on foreign policy in Parliament. The initiative of the campaign was taken by a couple of activists in the Norwegian peace movement: ^{activists in} (the Norwegian Peace Council, affiliated with IPB in Geneva, the Norwegian Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Norwegian section of War Resisters' International) and the head of the information office of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Defence and Civil Emergency Planning. Although the initiators of the campaign had followed this matter for time in foreign newspapers, the campaign was a spontaneous enterprise, and did

not originate as the result of debates in any organisation. The initiators were soon joined by other people, some of whom had been active (as had two of the initiators) in the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb.

The campaign's first step was the publishing of an appeal in some of the major Oslo newspapers on 25 October, when the Foreign Minister was to present the question of new missiles to Parliament. The petition was signed by 100 persons, most of whom were well known in different sectors of Norwegian society, and who could not easily be stigmatised as "professional protesters". The signatures had been collected over the telephone in the course of two days. At the same time as the appeal was published in Norwegian newspapers it was presented to the Prime Minister by a delegation from the campaign. The appeal read as follows:

In December, Norway will participate in a decision on the desirability or not of the production and deployment in Europe of new long-range nuclear missiles.

We request the Government to oppose the NATO plans for new nuclear weapons.

A decision to deploy these long-range nuclear weapons will lead to new and uncontrolled increases in the nuclear armaments. The nuclear arms race ~~will~~ leads to reduced security and to waste of resources.

NATO has already sufficient nuclear weapons to deter attack. The greater the number of long-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, the greater will be the number of military targets which the opponent will seek to reach, and the greater will be the destruction during war.

Norway must work actively for a reduction of the nuclear forces of the Warsaw and NATO countries in Europe.

It should be noted that the campaign was directed explicitly against nuclear weapons in both the West and the East, as the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb had ~~also~~ opposed both the neutron bomb and USSR arms build-up.

After the Foreign Minister's speech in Parliament on 25 October, it was clear that the Government probably would support a NATO decision in favour of cruise and Pershing II missiles, even if the Minister's speech was couched in cautious terms. But it was also obvious that the Government would meet considerable opposition in its own party, the Labour Party. How strong that opposition would be was not yet known.

The Foreign Minister's speech was to be debated in Parliament on 1 November. The campaign launched a telephone relay, asking people through leaflets, letters and advertisements to telephone their support for the appeal to the campaign office and

to ask friends and colleagues to do the same thing. Since time was scarce, this was the best way to spread the campaign. In the course of three and a half days, the campaign received about 1,500 statements of support over the phone. These were presented to the Speaker in Parliament on 1 November. The day before the campaign had presented all MPs with a 6 page statement arguing against the NATO plans, and with reference to a number of authoritative sources. The statement may be summarised as follows:

1. A decision in favour of NATO's medium-range missiles will most probably lead to new increases in nuclear armaments in the coming years.
2. The nuclear weapons will not increase NATO's capacity of deterrence.
3. NATO has even today at its disposal nuclear systems that may be compared with the Soviet Union's SS-20.
4. A decision in favour of new medium-range missiles will make negotiations difficult and will be an obstacle to arms control.
5. The Government has not presented an analysis of the probable consequences of introduction of new missiles.
6. A decision in favour of new nuclear weapons will conflict with statements that the Government has made earlier about the necessity of halting further development of nuclear weapons.

The statement to the MPs concluded with an appeal to each Member of Parliament to make efforts to ensure a decision in Brussels that would not lead to production and deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe. The statement further asked "that initiatives be taken for effective and gradual dismantling of the nuclear systems of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe".

The campaign continued the collection of signatures for its appeal, mainly through leaflets and signature forms, partly received over the phone, partly through advertisements, (financed through contributions from signatories) in the larger newspapers. From time to time advertisements, some of them full page, were published with a selection of names of signatories. The frequent advertisements were a means of making opposition visible and of focussing on the issue.

Throughout November local groups sprung up throughout the country. The campaign had 15-20 local groups in the major cities and towns, and a large number of individual contacts, who organised public meetings and canvassed signatures. A press service was developed with regular press bulletins either giving factual information on the question (and information about developments

abroad) or making political statements on current developments.

At an early stage, through a telegram on 4 November, the campaign appealed to the President of the USSR to abstain from further production and deployment of the SS-20 missile. "It is now time for the ~~px~~ nations to work for gradual disarmament and abolition of the nuclear systems of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe", the telegram stated.

Later, on 28 November, a telegram was addressed to the NATO heads of government:

The Norwegian campaign against new nuclear weapons, which is supported by people in most political parties and by members of a large number of organisations in Norway, wishes to express its concern over the continued arms race between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Although nuclear weapons, in accordance with established Norwegian nuclear policy, are not to be deployed on Norwegian territory in peacetime, the NATO proposal for deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe affects our nation as well as any other nation in Europe. These missiles will most probably lead to a new and uncontrollable arms race between East and West and will be an obstacle to the process of détente in Europe. The Norwegian campaign against new nuclear weapons, which in a telegram to President Brezhnev today has repeated its demand that the production and deployment of SS-20 missiles be halted, strongly appeals to all NATO governments to oppose the plans for medium-range missiles in Europe and to take steps for negotiations about a gradual reduction of the nuclear ~~x~~ systems of NATO and WTO in Europe. We believe that there is now an historic opportunity to halt the arms race between East and West. This opportunity can only be grasped if political leaders in both NATO and WTO recognise, not only in words but also in deeds, their responsibility for disarmament and abstain from further increases in nuclear armaments.

A similar telegram was addressed to President Brezhnev, repeating the demand that production and deployment of SS-20 missiles be halted.

One of the main functions of the campaign was that of a catalyst of opposition. The campaign concentrated on the collection of signatures and dissemination of information. Efforts were made to maintain a fairly high standard with regard to technical issues of arms control and disarmament, and the campaign was successful in this respect. Contacts with leading politicians were mostly limited to formal delegations. Lobbying was left to opposition groups within the various parties. On the whole, the campaign was only a part of a broad movement, but as a catalyst a very important part. An

indicator of the intensity of the debate in newspapers is the fact that the campaign, which subscribed to a newspaper clipping service, in the course of 7 or 8 weeks received more than 5,000 press cuttings on nuclear weapons, most of them dealing with the current issue.

The campaign was a campaign of individuals, organisations could not be affiliated with the campaign. Thus the members of the steering committee functioned as private persons, not as representatives of organisations or political parties that they might be members of. This structure was chosen partly for practical, partly for political reasons. Since time was scarce, (the campaign was a constant and nearly inhumanly tough fight of deadlines and time limits), it was crucial to avoid a structure that involved time-consuming formal debates, as a campaign consisting of organisations so often entails, and on the other hand a campaign of individuals would function far more effectively vis-a-vis groups and political parties where opinions were divided on the issue.

Altogether the appeal of the campaign received 69,000 signatures in the course of 6 weeks - under the circumstances a fairly good result for a country like Norway. During the final week public meetings and marches were organised in several larger towns and cities. A delegation was also sent to the demonstrations in Brussels on 9 December. In a final full page advertisement in the principal Labour Party newspaper, and also published in another leading Oslo newspaper, the campaign summarised the opposition to the NATO plans by listing major organisations, political parties and sections of political parties which had adopted resolutions against the new missiles.

11 out of 20 county boards of the ^{governing} Labour Party passed resolutions against the NATO plans, and only one Labour Party county board adopted a resolution supporting the Government's position. About 10 out of 20 county boards of the Labour Party women's organisation protested against the plans, and to our knowledge none supported the Government. Similarly a large number of local sections of the Labour Party opposed the plans and demanded immediate negotiations. The Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist Left Party (which each poll about 4-5 per cent of the votes in general elections) were against the plans for new nuclear weapons, as was the Communist Party. All the parties' youth organisations, with the exception of the Conservatives, and 7 major trades union federations, as well as a large number of

individual trades unions protested. One third of the national board of representatives of the Christian People's Party were against the plans, and the situation in the party's parliamentary group was similar. There was also opposition within the agrarian Centre Party, where particularly a group of women advocated the rejection of the plans. Further, a large number of peace organisations, student organisations, women's organisations etc. protested, as did the Association of War Veterans 1939-45. It should also be noted that the Norwegian Church Council's Committee on Socioethical Issues passed a resolution which asked the Government to oppose the plans for new nuclear weapons.

Although the Norwegian grass roots lost the battle of Brussels (the Norwegian government supported the NATO decision of 12 December 1979), we won the battle of the public opinion. An opinion poll taken in the latter half of November 1979 indicated that 44 per cent of the population opposed the plans for new nuclear missiles, 37 per cent supported the plans, and 19 per cent did not know which position to take. Opposition was strongest among women (48 per cent) and among respondents under 30 years (52 per cent). When the figures were broken down in relation to political party preference, it turned out that only in the groups supporting the Conservative and the Centre parties were there a majority who supported the NATO plans, and as much as 25 per cent of those who indicated a preference for the Conservative Party opposed the plans.

After the decision of the NATO Council in Brussels on 12 December 1979, the campaign issued a statement where it expressed its fear that the decision might "prove "the first step on the ~~roads~~ road towards a new and uncontrollable armaments race between East and West" ^{and} that the decision probably would stimulate further arms build-up in the East and increase international tension. The statement concluded by expressing concern over the future that the decision might lead us into, and pointed to the need of establishing "a broad international movement against deployment ~~of new nuclear weapons~~ of new nuclear weapons and for disarmament in East and West".³⁾

3.4. Women for Peace in the Shadow of Brussels and Afghanistan - Spring 1980

The beginning of 1980 was dominated by the shadow from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The international situation was grave, prospects of disarmament negotiations dark. The Soviet invasion - a tragedy to the Afghan people as all occupations are - seemed an invaluable present to hawks and cold warriors in the West.

Against the background of the East-West deadlock, the Swedish Social Democrats urged that the process of détente must be carried on and proposed a European disarmament conference to be held in Stockholm. Similar proposals aiming at détente and disarmament negotiations were made by the Nordic Conference of Social Democratic Women. But the proposals received little attention. In Norway the leader of the Social Democratic youth organisation argued that the Brussels decision must be cancelled to make negotiations possible.

For political and practical reasons No to New Nuclear Weapons decided to abstain from external activities for some time and to concentrate on the building of a permanent campaign against nuclear weapons, and on clarifying for its own benefit what possibilities existed for disarmament negotiations in the new situation. It was obvious that the principal forum envisaged in the disastrous Brussels decision, SALT III, could not be opened.

Meanwhile women in Norway and other Scandinavian countries had the political courage and perspicacity to launch a women's movement for disarmament and peace. The idea of Women for Peace originated in Denmark and Finland and immediately spread to Norway and Sweden. At an informal meeting in Oslo in January 1980 an appeal was drafted, which was to form the basis of a campaign canvassing signatures for the next five months:

Women for Peace

Scandinavian women say:

Stop! We have had enough!

We are driven to despair by the way things are going. It is becoming clearer and clearer that women all over the world have the same thought and fear: Is there any future for our children? Together with women over the whole world we will turn our impotence into strength.

We, the undersigned women in the Nordic countries, will no longer silently accept the great powers' struggle

for superiority. All acts of aggression must be stopped immediately, and negotiations for disarmament must be resumed at once and lead to action.

We demand:

Disarmament for lasting world peace!

The millions spent on weapons to be used for providing food!

NO to war!

In Norway the petition was originally signed by a group of 332 women, representing a broad political and professional spectrum.

The Nordic campaign was launched on 15 February in Denmark and a few days later in Norway. The organisational structure was informal and horizontal. Emphasis was placed on decentralised initiatives, every woman or group of women was to be "their own campaign leadership". The informal action committee in Oslo was in charge of practical matters, such as the printing of leaflets and posters, and also represented the movement in national news media.

The campaign received fairly good coverage in the media, even if some representatives of the movement complained that the male dominated news media showed little interest. This criticism does not seem very convincing, however. On the contrary, the very strength of the campaign (also vis-a-vis the media) was that it was a women's movement based on the one hand on traditional women's values ("Is there any future for our children?") and on the other hand, ^{representing} ~~an~~ break-away from the traditional passiveness of women with regard to armaments and disarmament ("we will turn our impotence into strength").

Women for Peace was (and is) an expression of the strong disarmament attitudes that are found among women in Norway in the current situation. A number of opinion polls have shown that women are more afraid of a war than men, and that more women than men oppose ^{the} plans for new nuclear weapons or the current programme for pre-positioning of heavy US military materiel in Norway. But it is also typical that the percentage of "don't know'ers" in opinions polls is higher among women than among men.

In Norway, Women for Peace (who printed special signature lists for men who wanted to support the movement) selected 8 March (women's international day) and 8 May (the day of Norway's liberation in 1945) as special days of action. On 8 May public meetings or rallies were organised in several towns and cities.

About 70,000 signatures were collected in Norway, a total of

500,000 in the Nordic countries. The petition and the signatures were presented to the UNO Conference of Women in Copenhagen in the middle of July 1980.

During the spring of 1980 the idea of Women for Peace moved beyond the borders of the Nordic countries and groups were formed in e.g. Switzerland and West Germany. After July 1980 the movement continued in Norway largely as an informal network of study groups and with their own newsletter. The original organisational structure has been maintained, and various types of actions have been initiated by local groups. On the whole the movement has proved ~~fairly~~ important for the mobilisation of women against the arms race.⁴⁾

3.5. The Campaign Against Pre-Positioning of Heavy US Military Materiel - Autumn 1980

On 12 February, only two months after the NATO decision of deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe, plans were disclosed by the Norwegian press for pre-positioning of heavy US military materiel in Norway. According to the news reports, which were partly based on an article in the New York Times, a joint Norwegian-US study group proposed pre-positioning of military materiel for at least one US brigade earmarked for transfer to Norway in a contingency situation. Although this was the first specific reference to the plans, it had been known for two or three years to observers (though not to the general public) that pre-storing of allied materiel was being considered.

The press reports did not give rise to any significant public debate during the spring, probably because of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, during the summer and early autumn of 1980 a debate developed and ultimately revealed a massive opposition to the plans. Opposition was strong within the governing Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party opposed the plans, and so did, to all intents and purposes, the Radical Liberal Party. The Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Centre Party supported the plans, and opponents in the two latter parties seemed to make little headway. At the grass roots large groups were against the Government's proposal and a campaign against pre-positioning was established in the middle of September.

The Norwegian authorities presented the plans for pre-positioning as a defensive measure to support Norwegian forces in case of a Soviet attack, the rationale being the increased Soviet capacity on the Norwegian sea and the North Atlantic. It was argued that the increased Soviet capacity would make the transport by sea of heavy US materiel in war most uncertain or impossible, and that materiel had to be stored in advance in peacetime in order, among other reasons, to protect air bases and harbours for ships that might get through. The stocks would include 155 mm howitzers (dual capable artillery with a range of up to 30 km), 2 sets of Hawk airfield defence rockets, ammunition, fuel, carriers for heavy transportation duties, dried food etc. This equipment would be earmarked for a US Marine brigade corps of about 10,000 soldiers to be transferred to Norway in a contingency situation.

The opposition saw it differently. The plans were partly seen against the background of the communication by the then US Secretary of Defence to Congress in January 1980 about pre-positioning, and it was felt that the plans were part of US strategic interests rather than measures suitable for the defence of Norwegian interests, and that the plans involved a capacity of a highly offensive kind. The opposition was particularly interested in the aircraft that would be transferred together with the US Marine brigade, and feared that the plans would establish an unmanned, forward base which could be used for strategic US purposes, e.g. strategic bombing of a key Soviet capability, the Murmansk-Kola complex. In the public debate that emerged, references were also frequently made to US nuclear doctrines, such as the recently issued Presidential Directive 59 with its emphasis on nuclear warfighting capabilities and to the possibility that Europe would become a theatre of nuclear war in a confrontation between the superpowers. Thus, in the debate, the issue of pre-positioning came to be linked to the questions of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. The plans were also seen as a most ill-judged proposal in a tense international situation when the need for détente was greater than ever before.

As it gradually became clear that there was considerable opposition to the plans both in the governing Labour Party and in the Norwegian public opinion in general, a campaign was launched on 15 September. The protest statement for which the

campaign canvassed signatures was addressed to the Government and was very simple: "We oppose pre-positioning of heavy US military materiel in Norway". A separate leaflet presented the premises for the protest:

... It has been pointed out by Alva Myrdal that the superpowers seem to have developed a policy which in its consequences makes Europe the battlefield in a superpower conflict. War is more likely to break out if the superpowers manage to move it away from their own territories.

US weapons at considerable expense on Norwegian soil means a new turn of the armaments spiral. Many people today are afraid of the future. This crude fact must be taken seriously by the authorities. We must get off the armaments roundabout, and a first step is a No to pre-positioning.

The leaflet gave factual information about the plans and posed the following questions to the military and political authorities:

- Does not tension in the North increase when one of the superpowers stores military materiel on Norwegian soil?
- Is not the international situation already so tense that it would be most rational not to take measures which will increase ^{the} superpowers' interests in what is taking place on Norwegian territory?
- Is it not true, as e.g. Alva Myrdal has claimed, that the development of arms technology and the great power strategy make Europe a theatre of war in case of a confrontation between the superpowers, even if the conflict may originate in other areas?
- Is it not right, then, to try to pour oil on the troubled waters, and to make efforts to open talks across the borders instead of establishing new stocks of weapons?

By 1 November the campaign had 80 action groups, a number which later increased to about 200. A large number of public meetings were held all over the country, and at the end of November and beginning of December torch parades were organised in several towns and cities. On 4 December 105,000 signatures were presented to the Prime Minister.

The Norwegian people was divided over the issue of pre-positioning. Public opinions surveys gave somewhat different results depending on the formulation of the questions. Opinion polls which asked for the respondents' attitudes to pre-storing of US military materiel indicated a growing opposition among those who had taken a stand on the question and eventually a slight majority against the plans: 45 per cent were against the plans in September, 52 per cent in November and 51 per cent in December. Opinion polls which asked about people's attitudes

to pre-storing of allied military materiel also indicated growing opposition during the autumn and early winter, but the percentages were generally lower: 37 in September, 37 in December and 42 in January.

Although there was considerable opposition to the plans within the governing Labour Party from the very outset, this opposition was hampered during the autumn by the fact that the party was losing support in the population at this time, while support of the Conservatives was on the increase. This made it possible for the Government and the party leadership to pursue a hard line vis-a-vis the opposition while at the same time appealing for unity within the party. On 13 January 1981 the plans for pre-positioning were accepted by Parliament.

The struggle against pre-positioning was another milestone in the development of a broad popular movement for nuclear disarmament in Norway. One may ask why the plans stirred up so much opposition, considering that ~~allied~~ military materiel for allies has been pre-stored in Norway since the 1950s/1960 without any massive overt opposition. Similarly, a number of installations and facilities which contribute to the strategic use of nuclear weapons have been established on Norwegian territory since the late '50s without the emergence of any campaign.

Part of the answer is probably that the campaign against pre-positioning was largely the aftermath of the struggle against new nuclear weapons the preceding autumn. It was felt that the Government was trying ~~once~~ more to ignore public opinion and to have the plans accepted without any broad democratic debate. Many Norwegians probably felt that the Government, which had overridden the Norwegian public opinion in the matter of new eurostrategic weapons, underestimated and insulted the disarmament forces when it proposed measures which could hardly be seen as anything else than a contribution to arms build-up and increased tension in the North.

The ~~struggle~~ against new nuclear weapons in the autumn of 1979 probably also paved the way for the campaign against pre-positioning by creating a new awareness of the nuclear arms race and Norway's involvement in this race. The debate had a considerable educational value regarding concepts such as nuclear warfighting, first strike, limited nuclear war etc. Gradually a new consciousness ^{emerged} about Europe as a potential

theatre of nuclear war in a confrontation between the super-powers. Presidential Directive 59 was also an important element in this educational process.

And, not least important, the struggle against new nuclear weapons the preceding autumn had definitively proved that there was a potential in the Norwegian public opinion for a broad movement against the arms race and for nuclear disarmament.

Another important factor was probably the cumulative effect of the disclosures during the past 4 or 5 years of strategic installations for US purposes on Norwegian soil or in Norwegian territorial waters. These disclosures indicated how closely Norway is linked to the front of the arms race between the superpowers.⁵⁾

3.6. The Establishment of the Information Committee for Defence Debate - Autumn 1980

In autumn 1980 an Information Committee for Defence Debate was established. The committee is not ~~an action committee~~ but has been established for the dissemination of information about defence issues. It has become evident in recent years that the Norwegian authorities have been reluctant to give ~~adequate~~ information to the population about current issues of armaments and disarmament. This was the case in question of new nuclear weapons (TNF) in autumn 1979. This has also been the case in connection with strategic installations on Norwegian territory. Often information has had to be obtained from US Congress sources. A need has also been felt for a more comprehensive debate about Norwegian defence and security policy.

The Information Committee, which was sponsored by 115 persons with different political and professional backgrounds, was presented at a press conference on 22 October 1980. The following statement, signed by the 115 sponsors, ~~was handed out~~:

Nuclear war is now not only a frightening thought but a probable possibility. In view of the increasing nuclear build-up in Europe and the plans for pre-positioning of US military materiel in Norway, many of us feel that we more than ever before may come to share in the responsibility for a catastrophe which we must never allow to happen.

Norway is a small country, but also a nation which has been given the honour of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize, and which unlike many other countries is growing richer and richer. This also involves a greater responsibility in our world. It is therefore our view that Norway must
- increase its efforts to ensure peace in the world

- maintain better its national independence and avoid that Norway becomes one of the first targets in a coming war.

Since its establishment, the Information Committee has produced a literature offer for study and action groups, held public meetings with highly qualified speakers and produced several leaflets and brochures. One of the leaflets suggests a defence concept comprising "active peace work, an independent defence without support of nuclear weapons, civilian resistance and non-violent strategies".

3.7. No to Nuclear Weapons: A Nuclear-Free Zone of the Nordic Countries - Spring 1981

No to New Nuclear Weapons started out as a spontaneous campaign against new eurostrategic nuclear weapons in autumn 1979. In January 1980, the campaign, which has later changed its name to No to Nuclear Weapons, decided to become a permanent campaign for nuclear disarmament. The following platform, based in part directly on articles 18 and 11 in the Final Document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament of 1978, was adopted:

Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race - in particular the nuclear arms race - increases the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. In spite of this the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it and represents a threat to peace.

This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardises the security of all states, heightens the sense of insecurity among all states, including the non-nuclear-weapon states, and increases the threat of war.

Against this background, which was emphasised by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, the campaign No to New Nuclear Weapons will work for the following objectives:

1. The campaign will oppose new nuclear weapons in the East and West and will work for the reduction and ~~elimination of the~~ existing nuclear weapons.

2. The campaign will work for the objective of halting proliferation of nuclear weapons and will also see proliferation in the context of the continual nuclear

build-up of the great powers.

3. The campaign will work for the objective of ensuring adequate information to the Norwegian people on questions of armaments and disarmament, and for active participation of the Norwegian people in the efforts for disarmament.

The campaign does not take a stand on whether Norway should retain a conventional military defence, or on the level of conventional armaments. These are questions that lie outside the scope of the campaign. Thus in a leaflet the campaign is described as a forum where "pacifists, adherents of NATO and opponents of NATO may unite in a common cause: Resistance against nuclear weapons". The campaign is lead by a steering committee, assisted by a council, which has an advisory function. It may be an indicator of the political wing-spread of the campaign that among the 80 council members are members of most political parties in Norway. Another indicator is the fact that in spring 1980 the then leaders or deputy leaders of all major political youth organisations (with the exception of the Conservatives, the Marxist-Leninists and the Communists) were members of either the council or the steering committee.

The campaign decided to wait until the issue of pre-positioning had been settled before launching any major project. Meanwhile policy discussions continued and on 10 November 1980 the following programme of action was adopted:

1. Gradual dismantling of the nuclear weapons in the East and the West.

The use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity, and the stockpiles of such weapons must be removed gradually through binding agreements. In particular, the negotiations about nuclear weapons in Europe must lead to an agreement of not producing and deploying the 572 new nuclear missiles of NATO and of halting the production and deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. The aim of the negotiations must be to stop these weapons, not only to arrive at a ceiling after the weapons have been introduced.

2. No nuclear weapons in Norway in peace or war.

Norway must do everything possible to avoid that the country becomes a battlefield in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons and delivery systems for such weapons must not be stationed on Norwegian territory, neither in peacetime nor in wartime. Norwegian authorities must not permit allies to use nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory, nor participate in preparations for such use.

3. A nuclear-freezone of the Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries must as soon as possible be established as a nuclear-free zone with the necessary guarantees from

the nuclear powers. This must be seen in the context of the efforts to arrive at a more comprehensive agreement of a nuclear-free Europe. In its work for this goal the campaign will operate in close contact with the European campaign for nuclear disarmament, END (European Nuclear Disarmament), and No to Nuclear Weapons endorses the main parts of its programme, as it is formulated in the manifesto from the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

In its practical work the campaign will produce and disseminate unbiassed and reliable information about questions of armaments and disarmament. It is the aim of the campaign to strengthen the active public opinion against the nuclear build-up.

The programme of action was presented at a press conference at the beginning of December 1980, and at a conference at the end of February 1981, attended by 250 delegates from 17 out of Norway's 20 counties, the implementation of the programme was discussed. At the end of April 1981 a massive signature collecting campaign for a Nordic nuclear-free zone was launched, on the basis of the following petition addressed to the Norwegian parliament and government:

We request the Norwegian parliament to resolve that the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory never be allowed, and we request the Government to make every possible effort to establish a nuclear-free zone comprising Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, and guaranteed by treaty.

In a text accompanying the petition proper, No to Nuclear Weapons gives the following rationale for the petition:

The superpowers are building up their arsenals with increasingly dangerous atomic weapons. The danger of a catastrophe is greater than at any time since the Second World War. In a new war the Nordic countries will be front-line states and Europe the main battlefield. Alva Myrdal has characterised Europe as "the hostage of the superpowers".

We cannot accept this. We know that nuclear arms can never defend any country, they can only destroy all life and all values. In a nuclear war there are only losers.

Nuclear weapons are a breach of all the basic principles contained in the international conventions of war. The use of them is a crime against humanity and can never be justified even in a critical situation.

We are convinced that the peoples of the other Nordic countries share our view on this matter and we demand that there be set up a permanent nuclear-free zone, comprising Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. This zone must be established by treaty as recommended in the final document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament of 1978.

According to such a treaty, the states in the zone shall commit themselves to remain free of nuclear weapons, while the nuclear powers solemnly guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against the zone. Supple-

mentary agreements and control ordinances may also be needed. These shall be negotiated between the parties concerned.

The plan for a nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries does not aim at changing the basic security policy or the alliances of any Nordic country, but at maintaining stability and low tension in Northern Europe.

The primary aim of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is to contribute to détente by preventing nuclear build-up and so reduce the danger of nuclear war in our region. We hope that other countries will follow our lead so that the Nordic zone may prove a step on the way to a Europe free of nuclear weapons and a safer world for us all. The goal is a world freed from the threat of extinction.

Let us preserve the world for coming generations!

It should be emphasised that No to Nuclear Weapons sees a Nordic nuclear-free zone primarily as a contribution to détente between the power blocs, a measure which may pave the way for further confidence building measures. Public opinion surveys show that the demand for a Nordic nuclear-free zone has strong support in the Norwegian population. An opinion poll published in April 1981 indicated that 44 per cent of the population believe a treaty-bound nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries will reduce the danger of an attack on Norway, while 38 per cent believe the risk will increase. A recent opinion poll published in July seems to indicate a growing support of nuclear-free zones. To the question "It has been proposed that the Nordic countries and parts of Europe should be established as nuclear-free zones; are you for or against the establishment of such zones?" 69 per cent of the respondents answered that they favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones, while 14 per cent did not. 6 per cent believed that nuclear-free zones did not make any difference, and 10 per cent had no view on the matter. When asked about party preference, it turned out that there was a majority in favour of nuclear-free zones in all political parties.

As for the campaign's demand that the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory shall never be allowed, a public opinion survey last December indicated that 63 per cent of the population support this demand, while 9 per cent do not.

In connection with this autumn's general election No to Nuclear Weapons, which has now more than 300 local groups and contacts and which seems to be developing into a real popular movement, has been trying to focus attention on the questions of nuclear disarmament and a Nordic nuclear-free zone by asking the main candidates for the new parliament about their views on these

matters. Their answers are published in regional campaign newspapers, which are distributed to the electors. Although nuclear disarmament, and particularly the proposal for a nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries, has been a dominant political issue the past six months, it may still be too early to predict the issues of the election. It is clear, however, that the Labour Party at present regards nuclear disarmament and a Nordic nuclear-free zone as important election issues. This fact reflects the strength of the public opinion and the broad movement for nuclear disarmament which has been developing since the autumn of 1979.

Traditionally the official attitude to proposals for a Nordic nuclear-free zone has been that the Nordic countries de facto constitute such a zone already and that a possible zone would have to be part of a more comprehensive European agreement. It has also been pointed to the fact that nuclear weapons are deployed on Soviet territory in Northern Europe.

Although No to Nuclear Weapons, inspired by the excellent manifesto of European Nuclear Disarmament, for some time had been considering what could be Norway's contribution to the long-term goal of a nuclear-free Europe, the new debate about a Nordic nuclear-free zone was triggered, not by the campaign, but by a former Labour Party Cabinet Minister in a speech given at the General Conference of the Norwegian Federation of Chemical Workers on 8 October last year. A Nordic nuclear-free zone was proposed as a step towards a more comprehensive European zone. The proposal proved rather controversial and the speech was at first rather severely criticised by some of the Labour Party leadership. However, less than two months later, the tide had turned and the Labour Party's national board recommended the proposal for inclusion in the party's programme of action. And on 3 April this year the General Conference of the Labour Party adopted the following statement:

Norway will work for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as part of the efforts to reduce the nuclear weapons in a larger European context.

This statement is ambiguous primarily in two respects: (1) the geographical concept of the "Nordic area" is not defined, and (2) a Nordic nuclear-free zone may be seen as a step which may facilitate reductions of nuclear arms in a larger European context, or as a step which presupposes such reductions.

There are at least two reasons for this ambiguity. On the one hand, the proposal is still in its early stage and has to be further elaborated in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. And on the other hand, different and conflicting views are found within the Labour Party.

The proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone - which this past spring has been adopted in more or less precise terms by most political parties in Norway, and which has been sharply ^{and unjustly} criticised by the Conservatives for being a unilateral measure - has recently gained further political support. A most important development was the adoption by the Norwegian Trade Union Congress of a proposal for a nuclear-free zone comprising Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. At the General Conference on 8 May an amendment from the floor to the somewhat vaguer motion presented by the Congress leadership was adopted with 156 votes in favour and 129 against:

The trade union movement will work actively for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries. The efforts to establish nuclear-free zones should be seen in the context of negotiations about reductions of nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe.

The General Conference of the Norwegian Trade Union Congress request the Norwegian parliament to resolve that the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory never be allowed, and request the Government to make every possible effort to establish a nuclear-free zone, comprising Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, and guaranteed by treaty.

This resolution is regarded as more radical than the programme of action of the Labour Party, since it ^{unconditionally} ~~unconditionally~~ asks for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory, and since it defines the geographical area of the zone. Actually, the second paragraph is identical with the petition that No to Nuclear Weapon has been spreading in its campaign since the end of April this year.

At a meeting of the Social Democratic Parties of the Nordic countries on 18 May, the parties agreed to work for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, and a working group was set up. At the end of May the question was also discussed, informally and in a very preliminary manner, by the Prime Ministers of these countries. Press reports seem to indicate that at this time in the Nordic countries there may be somewhat different views on the significance of a zone.

However, there is little doubt that a process has been started. It seems likely that the further development of the proposal, to make it a realistic and feasible policy, may to a large extent depend on the strength of the popular movements in the countries concerned.

The most recent developments in this matter are signals from the Soviet Union that the USSR may be willing to include certain nuclear systems in the negotiations about a Nordic nuclear-free zone, while a visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to Washington has made it clear that the US government is very negative to the proposal. ^{for a Nordic nuclear-free zone} In spite of this, the Labour Party government has confirmed that work for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone will continue. ⁶⁾

Meanwhile the Peace March 1981 continues on the road for Paris. The march, which has received extraordinary publicity in Norway, goes under the slogan "a Nuclear-Free Europe from Poland to Portugal", one of the sub-slogans being "a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone". Originally the initiative of three Norwegian women, the march, which is supported in Norway by movements such as No to Nuclear Weapons and Women for Peace as well as by the major peace organisations, started from Copenhagen on 21 June and is scheduled to arrive in Paris on 5 August, where a peace festival is planned 6-9 August, i.e. from Hiroshima Day to Nagasaki Day.

3.8. Continued Resistance Against Cruise, Pershing II and SS-20

Although the issue of new eurostrategic weapons for the past year has been overshadowed by the issue of pre-positioning and the debate about a Nordic nuclear-free zone, there is little reason to believe that the opposition has dwindled since the autumn of 1979. Halting the new weapons is one of the prime priorities in the programme of action adopted by No to Nuclear Weapons. The campaign has several times addressed the Norwegian government to take initiatives so that the new weapons will not be deployed. Similarly the campaign has appealed to the Soviet Union to stop the deployment of the SS-20 missile.

In a recent letter to the Government the campaign states:

The Government has earlier placed decisive emphasis on what ~~are~~ the attitudes to deployment of the countries that are supposed to receive these weapons. There is a constantly growing opposition to the new weapons in most of these countries. We therefore appeal to the Government to support the strong forces in the NATO countries who are working to stop these weapons.

In a reply to a letter from the campaign last year the Foreign Minister stated that negotiations about nuclear weapons in Europe should "achieve as low a ceiling as possible, and that one should aim at the 'zero option' ". The Foreign Minister also pointed to the fact that NATO had obliged itself to consider the need for theatre nuclear forces in the light of the concrete results of negotiations".

The Prime Minister has recently stated, in a reply to a letter from President Brezhnev, that negotiations should lead to reductions in already deployed nuclear weapons so that the deployment of new weapons can be avoided.

Probably a new public debate about eurostrategic nuclear weapons may be expected as the commencement of negotiations is delayed and the time of deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles approaches.

4. Conclusion

The conflict over nuclear armaments and disarmament, for a long time a latent conflict in the Norwegian population, has become manifest, and a broad movement for nuclear disarmament has developed. The Norwegian "nuclear policy", the exaggerated secrecy with regard to strategic installations on Norwegian territory and the Norwegian security policy on the whole, and the relatively stable relationship between the superpowers since the Cuban crisis in the early 60s has probably stopped the dormant conflict from becoming overt to any significant extent before the end of the 1970s. Most important for the development of the new popular movement has been the awareness of the threat of recent developments in the nuclear arms race: the race for first strike capability, the idea of limited nuclear warfare, and the europe^{an}isation of the superpowers' nuclear strategies. Similarly, the serious setbacks in détente, with an increasing risk of a nuclear catastrophe, have liberated initiative at the grass roots in a protest for survival.

Anti-nuclear-weapon attitudes run deep in the Norwegian population. The new movement for nuclear disarmament crosscuts the traditional border-lines and constellations in Norwegian security policy (e.g. the somewhat barren conflicts of pro or con NATO-membership, and pro or con a military defence). Both the leadership of the various campaigns and the groups

supporting the campaigns comprise a broad spectrum of political views. Public opinion surveys, however uncertain details may be, show that attitudes for nuclear disarmament cannot be identified with anti-NATO sentiments. While recent opinion polls indicate that 74 per cent of the population are in favour of Norway's NATO-membership and 14 per cent against (September 1980), and that 60 per cent believe that NATO contributes to Norway's security and 14 per cent believe it increases the danger of an attack against Norway (November 1980), 44 per cent opposed and 37 per cent supported the plans for new nuclear weapons in November 1979, 63 per cent were against and 10 per cent in favour of allied use of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in December 1980, 44 per cent believed in April 1981 that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would reduce the danger of an attack against Norway and 38 per cent that the risk would increase, and in July 1981, 69 per cent were in favour of the establishment of "nuclear-free zones of the Nordic countries and ^{of} parts of Europe," while 14 per cent were against such zones.

A most important step forward for the movement for nuclear disarmament was the adoption by the Labour Party of the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The party leadership had overridden a majority of the Norwegian people and the Labour Party grass roots in the issue of new nuclear weapons in autumn 1979, and had similarly ignored the strong opposition to the plans for pre-positioning in autumn 1980. The adoption of the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone may in retrospect turn out to have been a kind of a breakthrough for the nuclear disarmament forces. But it is also obvious that the future of the proposal may to a large extent depend on the strength of the popular movement which is now developing.

The trade union movement has to a ~~great~~ extent supported the movement for nuclear disarmament from the autumn of 1979, even if the leadership of the Trade Union Congress still seems rather cautious. ⁸⁾

A most important development during the spring of 1981 was the development of a debate about nuclear disarmament in religious groups and church bodies. Some groups have already taken a stand against the nuclear arms race, and others are expected to follow their lead. The responsibility of the Church in the struggle for disarmament is the theme of a conference to be held in October.

Typical of the present situation is the multitude of different initiatives that are taken. Recently a Children's Peace Campaign has been launched, a group of medical doctors against nuclear and chemical weapons have been active for some time, scientists and engineers have launched a petition for zones free of chemical weapons, the Labour Party women's organisation is establishing an Alva Myrdal disarmament fund, local peace marches and peace relays are organised, a ministry or directorate for peace and disarmament has been proposed, etc.

Counter-initiatives are also launched. The campaign Protect Norway has been established in an attempt, not very successful, to counterbalance the movement for nuclear disarmament. The campaign claims that the anti-nuclear-weapon movement weakens our security policy and undermines our NATO membership. There have also been attempts at stigmatising the movement as ant unilateral and directed only against the nuclear arms build-up in the West, a criticism which is totally unjustified. Orchestrated writing of letters to the editor in a number of newspapers has also been one of the counter-strategies.

It seems certain, however, that unless any dramatic changes occur in the international situation, a popular movement for nuclear disarmament is now developing which may make a permanent impression on Norwegian politics.

20 July 1981

N o t e s

This is a revised and updated version of a paper originally prepared for European Nuclear Disarmament, Conference for Activist Movements, London 12 - 14 September 1980. Parts of the first version have been published in European Nuclear Disarmament - A Bulletin of Work in Progress, Nos 2 and 3, 1980, Nottingham, England.

1. A discussion of the Norwegian "nuclear policy" and Norway's involvement in the nuclear arms race (though not up to date) may be found in Sverre Lodgaard and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Norway - the not so reluctant ally", Cooperation and Conflict, vol. xii (1977), pp. 209-219. (Also available as PRIO publication no S-3/76 from International Peace Research Institute, Rådhusgt. 4, Oslo 1). Relevant are also Malvern Lumsden, "Disarmament, Development and the Role of Small Countries: The Case of Norway", PRIO publication no S-20/1978, and Sverre Lodgaard; "A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the North?" A Reappraisal", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, no 1, 1980, pp. 33-39. Readers with a knowledge of the Scandinavian languages are referred to the following books: N.P. Gleditsch et al, Norge i atomstrategien (Norway in the nuclear strategy), Oslo 1978, Thorbjørn Jagland et al (eds), Atomvåpen og usikkerhetspolitikk (Nuclear weapons and policy of insecurity), Oslo 1980, and Magne Barth (ed), Forhåndslagring i Norge? (Pre-positioning in Norway?), Oslo 1980.
2. The outline of the first wave of anti-nuclear-weapon protest is based on "Atomprotestkampanjen", PaxLeksikon, Oslo 1978, pp. 229-232. The account of the Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb and No to New Nuclear Weapons/No to Nuclear Weapons is primarily based on my own observations and files as an executive member of the former and co-founder, co-ordinator Oct. 1979 - Jan. 1980, and later international secretary of the latter. The descriptions of the other campaigns are also primarily based on my own observations and files.
3. A good documentary and account of the Norwegian struggle against new nuclear weapons autumn 1979 is Eva Nordland, Nedtelling? (Countdown?), Oslo 1980.
4. As part of the campaign the Danish Women for Peace published a book about their movement: Bodil Graae, Kvinderne og freden (Women and Peace), Århus 1980.
5. Magne Barth, op. cit., was published at the end of Oct. 1980 as a contribution to the debate about pre-positioning.
6. An historical outline of the debate from the 1960s onwards about a Nordic nuclear-free zone, and a discussion of some problems involved, may be found in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, No 1, 1980. See also Nuclear Disarmament News, No 2, 1981 (a newsletter published by, and available free of charge from No to Nuclear Weapons, Helgesensgt. 50, Oslo 5, Norway). A relevant publication available in Norwegian from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is Nedrustningsarbeidets plass i sikkerhetspolitikken (The role of disarmament in security policy), Oslo 1981.

In the Scandinavian languages, the geographical concept of the "Nordic countries" includes Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Traditionally the political debate about a Nordic nuclear-free zone has primarily been focussed on Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

When Iceland is not included at this time in the zone proposed by No to Nuclear Weapons, this is because it is felt that Iceland is so important for the American security system that including Iceland from the outset would make negotiations about a Nordic nuclear-free zone much more complicated. The exclusion of Iceland from the campaign's proposal at this stage has, however, met with criticism from people in Iceland.

The basic philosophy of No to Nuclear Weapons in this matter has been that the work for the establishment of a zone should begin where it is easiest to get started, in order to get a process going. See Professor Erik Alfson, "On a Nuclear-Free Zone of the Nordic Countries", Nuclear Disarmament News, No 2, 1981.

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7. Aspects of this latent conflict may even be found in Norwegian foreign policy elites. Thus, in a study of Norwegian foreign policy elites undertaken in 1967, the respondents were, among other things, asked the following question: "Can you imagine any value or aim which should justify taking the risk of a major war, where nuclear weapons are used?" About two thirds of those asked stated that they could imagine no such aim or value. Only 27 per cent of the leaders and 15 per cent of the opinion-makers answered in the affirmative.

This finding is remarkable, since Norway has accepted NATO's nuclear doctrine of a possible first use of nuclear weapons, and since even an incredible nuclear deterrent rests upon the determination and capability to use nuclear weapons "if necessary".

The study is published in Helge Hveem, International Relations and World Images, Oslo 1972, and is here quoted from Gunnar Garbo, "Disarmament Dilemmas of a Small Nation: The Case of Norway", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. vi, (1975).

8. An important event for the debate about nuclear disarmament in the Labour Party and the trade union movement was the publication in November 1980 of Thorbjørn Jagland et al (eds), Atomvåpen og usikkerhetspolitikk (Nuclear weapons and policy of insecurity). The book includes contributions from a number of representatives of the Labour Party, as well as from Alva Myrdal and Kalevi Sorsa, and has a preface written by chairpersons of six major trade union federations.